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AbsTrAcT
Cost and schedule overruns are the most common 
challenges in mega construction projects around 
the globe, and South Africa is no different. Although 
comparatively small in number, megaprojects have 
an inordinate number of projects failing, due to 
budget overflow and schedule slippage. This article 
assessed the causes of cost and schedule overruns 
as well as the challenges with the implementation of 
critical construction megaprojects, using Kusile and 
Medupi energy-sector megaprojects in South Africa. 
Using a quantitative research method, which 
included a literature review and a questionnaire 
survey, identified the causes of schedule and 
cost overruns as well as the challenges militating 
against the project’s implementation success. Data 
was collected from engineers, quantity surveyors, 
architects, contractors, and project managers who 
were randomly selected from the two megaprojects, 
Medupi and Kusile. Data was analysed using mean 
score ratings and ranking. The results revealed that 
slow client decision-making, shortages of skilled 
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labour, inaccurate material estimating, unforeseen ground conditions, poor material 
planning, changes in scope of work on-site, contractual claims, variation orders and 
poor site management were the major causes of schedule and cost overruns. Findings 
show that the top five challenges (poor site management, inadequate managerial skills, 
poor monitoring and control, unstable management structure, and lack of experience 
together with poor organisation structures) is all management and organisational 
related, showing that there is not enough local management and organisational 
expertise in South Africa to ensure the proper planning and effective implementation of 
energy megaprojects. This article is relevant, as it contributes to the understanding of 
key challenges faced by megaprojects in the context of a developing country. Specific 
solutions that mitigate the causes of schedule and cost overruns should be investigated 
in future studies. 
Keywords: Cost overruns, energy sector, megaprojects, schedule overruns
AbsTrAK
Oorskryding van koste en skedules is die mees algemene uitdagings in mega-
konstruksieprojekte regoor die wêreld, en Suid-Afrika is nie anders nie. Alhoewel 
dit relatief klein is, het megaprojekte ’n buitengewone aantal projekte wat misluk as 
gevolg van oorloop van die begroting en glyplanne. Hierdie artikel het die oorsake 
van koste- en skedule-oorskrywings, sowel as die uitdagings met die implementering 
van megaprojekte vir kritiese konstruksie, met behulp van megaprojekte vir die 
energiesektor (Kusile en Medupi) in Suid-Afrika, ondersoek. Deur gebruik te maak 
van ’n kwantitatiewe navorsingsmetode, wat ’n literatuuroorsig en ’n vraelysopname 
insluit, is die oorsake van skedule- en koste-oorskrydings, asook die uitdagings 
met megaprojekimplementering, geïdentifiseer. Data is versamel van ingenieurs, 
bourekenaars, argitekte, kontrakteurs en projekbestuurders wat lukraak gekies is uit die 
twee megaprojekte, Medupi en Kusile. Data is geanaliseer met behulp van gemiddelde 
telling graderings en posisie. Die resultate toon dat trae kliëntbesluitneming, tekort aan 
geskoolde arbeid, onakkurate materiaalberaming, onvoorsiene grondtoestande, swak 
materiaalbeplanning, veranderinge in werkomvang op die terrein, kontraktuele eise, 
afwykingsbevele en swak terreinbestuur die belangrikste oorsake van die skedule- en 
koste-oorskryding was. Resultate toon dat die top vyf uitdagings (swak terreinbestuur, 
onvoldoende bestuursvaardighede, swak monitering en beheer, onstabiele 
bestuurstruktuur en gebrek aan ervaring tesame met swak organisasiestrukture) alles 
bestuurs- en organisatories verwant is. Dit toon dat daar nie genoeg plaaslike bestuurs- 
en organisasiekundigheid in Suid-Afrika is om die behoorlike beplanning en effektiewe 
implementering van energie-megaprojekte te verseker nie. Hierdie artikel is relevant, 
aangesien dit bydra tot die begrip van die belangrikste uitdagings wat megaprojekte 
in die konteks van ’n ontwikkelende land in die gesig staar. In toekomstige studies 
moet spesifieke oplossings ondersoek word om die oorsake van skedule- en koste-
oorskrydings te verlig.
Sleutelwoorde: Koste-oorskryding, energiesektor, megaprojekte, skedule-oorskryding
1. iNTroducTioN
A megaproject is defined as a project that costs $1 billion or more 
(Flyvbjerg, 2014: 3). Megaprojects are expensive, and include many risk 
factors that can cause delays or failures during the project’s execution (Ma, 
Zeng, Lin, Chen & Shi, 2017: 1). In practice, cost and schedule overruns are 
generally an ongoing problem in megaprojects implementation in the vast 
majority of sectors (Aljohani, Ahiaga-Dagbui & Moore, 2017: 137; Famiyeh, 
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Amoatey, Adaku & Agbenohevi, 2017: 182). The Sydney Opera House is an 
example of a megaproject that was overbudget and completed well outside 
of the proposed schedule; it was ten years overschedule, and its construction 
cost was 1 400% overbudget (Flyvbjerg, 2014: 9). In the transportation 
sector, for instance, Flyvbjerg, Bruzelius and Rothengatter (2003: 1) 
conducted the largest and most encompassing study of cost overruns on a 
sample of 258 major roads, tunnels, bridges, urban transit, and interurban 
rail projects in 20 countries on five continents. The study concluded that nine 
out of ten megaprojects experienced cost overruns (Siemiatycki, 2015: 2).
In South Africa, large-scale projects are required by law to address both 
pro-growth and pro-poor socio-economic development goals (Sutherland, 
Sim & Scott, 2015: 185). Large-scale infrastructure projects in South Africa 
are promoted as having the possibility to drive economic growth, create 
employment opportunities, and ensure that benefits percolate to the poor 
and economically marginalised (Sutherland et al., 2015: 186). However, 
insisting on using megaprojects as a driver of economic growth and a means 
of social redistribution is challenging, as literature abundantly reveals their 
failure in addressing social concerns (Dupont, 2013: 3). 
There are a few megaprojects in progress or recently completed in South Africa 
in the energy and transport sectors, namely Medupi Power Station (Eskom), 
Kusile Power Station (Eskom), the New Multi-Product Pipeline (Transnet), 
and the Durban port upgrade and expansion project (Transnet). Medupi 
Power Station is a dry-cooled, coal-fired power station that is being built 
near Lephalale in Limpopo province. It is the fourth dry-cooled, baseload 
station to be built in 20 years by Eskom after Kendal, Majuba, and Matimba 
power stations (Phaahla, 2015: 2). Medupi and Kusile power stations have 
both suffered delays in construction. Medupi was initially planned to be 
completed in four years and is currently in its seventh year of construction, 
and was expected to be completed in 2019 (Phaahla, 2015: 2). The Kusile 
Power Station project, which is located near the existing Kendal Power 
Station, in the Nkangala district of Mpumalanga, will comprise six units, 
each rated at 800 MW installed capacity for a total capacity of 4 800 MW. 
Once completed, Kusile will be the fourth-largest coal-fired power station in 
the world (Eskom, 2019: 1). Kusile started in 2008 and was expected to be 
completed by the end of 2014; however, the project is still not completed. 
The original cost was estimated at R69.1 billion; by July 2016, the cost to 
completion (CTC) was placed at R160 billion (Yelland, 2019: 1).
The New Multi-Product Pipeline is South Africa’s largest pipeline project. 
It is designed to transport liquid fuel from Durban to Johannesburg. 
The pipeline system will transport five grades of refined fuel, and will 
provide three pump stations and delivery depots along the route as well 
as a coastal and inland fuel terminals. This new facility will provide the 
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capacity to meet the forecasted fuel needs of the inland market for the year 
2030 (ARUP, 2012: 1). The initial cost was R12.7 billion; this amount later 
increased to R15.4 billion and it further escalated to R23.4 billion in 2012. 
However, the state-owned entity has stated that R30.4 billion was ultimately 
invested in the pipeline project. The new multi-pipeline project has been 
dogged by delays and cost overruns, but it will significantly improve the 
security of supply risk for Gauteng’s fuel supply (Groenewald, 2017: 1).
There is also the Durban port upgrade and expansion project. Durban is 
the biggest and busiest port in South Africa, and the busiest in the southern 
hemisphere. It currently handles 64% of the country’s seaborne container 
traffic. Transnet is implementing this project to increase the Durban 
container terminal handling capacity (Barradas, 2017: 2). Transnet stated 
that its contractor has unfortunately terminated this R4.2 billion contract, 
which was meant to create deeper berths at the Durban container terminal 
(Barradas, 2019: 1).
To understand the influence of cost and schedule overruns in megaproject 
construction, it is important to identify and assess the challenges militating 
against megaprojects success in South Africa. The bias will be towards 
energy projects, as they are the biggest in value and have received the 
largest publicity and media scrutiny because of their importance to the 
functioning of the economy. This article, therefore, assessed the causes of 
schedule and cost overruns as well as the challenges experienced with the 
implementation of critical construction megaprojects, using the Kusile and 
Medupi energy sector in South Africa.
2. liTerATure review
2.1 cost and schedule overruns
Cost is the budgeted expenditure that the client has agreed to commit to 
the execution of the project (Subramani, Sruthi & Kavitha, 2014: 3). Cost 
overrun is defined as the difference between the actual and the estimated 
cost (Subramani et al., 2014: 3). According to Vidalis and Najafi (2002: 2388), 
cost overrun is a “percentage difference between the completion cost and 
the contract bid cost” (Shrestha, Burns & Shields, 2013: 2).
Time overrun is defined as the difference between the construction bid 
duration and the completion duration (Shrestha et al., 2013: 2). Mukuka, 
Aigbavboa and Thwala (2015: 1691) describe schedule overrun as the extra 
time required to complete a given project beyond its original planned duration, 
whether compensated for or not. Cost and schedule overruns is more pertinent 
when the failure affects the entire economy, such as in the implementation of 
energy projects that are critical in averting widespread load-shedding.
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2.2 causes and implications of megaproject delays and 
cost overruns
Approximately only 20% of megaprojects in Africa reach financial closure 
and can move to execution, due to cost and schedule overruns during 
construction (Adugna, 2015: 11; Deloitte, 2014: 3). 
Schedule overrun for megaprojects affects all project stakeholders such as 
clients, contractors, engineers, regulators, and politicians, and is critical to 
both the contractor and project owner in terms of money and performance, 
respectively (Subramani et al., 2014: 1; Alaghbari, Kadir, Salim & 
Ernawati, 2007: 193). The causes of schedule overruns can be related to 
the contractor, the consultant, the client, and/or other external factors that 
occur prior to and during the construction phase (Mukuka et al., 2015: 1691). 
Schedule overrun becomes a liability for contractors when the completion 
period becomes longer, raw materials may get more costly, due to inflation, 
and labour costs can increase (Subramani et al., 2014: 2). In South African 
energy megaprojects, the client is essentially the government through its 
agency (parastatal) Eskom.
There is a perception that large projects will produce economies of scale; 
therefore, most of the megaprojects are financed by national governments and 
private capital development banks (Callegari, Szklo & Schaeffer, 2018: 211). 
Endemic cost overruns of megaprojects invested in, could, as a result, 
decrease the investment appeal of these megaprojects (Flyvbjerg, 2014: 5) 
and the suboptimal use of taxpayers’ money (Shrestha et al., 2013: 1). 
Project environment challenges, due to weather attributes such as severe 
wind, precipitation, floods, or hail, can delay the project, due to reduced 
visibility to move equipment, delays in the delivery of materials, reduced 
access to the site for workers, damaged infrastructure, and the loss of 
electrical power (Akanni, Oke & Akpomiemie, 2014: 92). Political instability 
can derail a project (Akanni et al., 2014: 92).
Research conducted in Hong Kong identified that causes of delay in 
construction projects include poor site administration and management; 
unanticipated ground conditions; slow decision-making by all project teams; 
employer-initiated variations; essential variation of works; the non-existence 
of effective communication, and possible preconceptions (Adugna, 2015: 25).
In Malaysia, the main causes of cost overruns and delays in building 
construction projects are poor scheduling and control of time; delays in 
the preparation of design documents; ineffective communication between 
stakeholders; changes in laws and regulations; low labour productivity; lack 
of knowledge in executing methods (Tahir, Haron, Alias & Diugwu, 2017: 1); 
contractor’s financial problems that result in the shortage of construction 
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materials on-site; owner’s financial problems and slowness in decision-
making; consultant’s poor supervision and delays in issuing instructions, 
and external factors such as materials shortage and poor site condition 
(Musa, 2012: 5).
Studies in South Africa on the causes of delays in construction projects, 
not necessarily megaprojects, include delays such as approval of shop 
drawings; delays in contractors’ payments; design changes; conflicts in the 
subcontractors’ work schedule; slow decision-making; design errors; labour 
shortage; insufficient labour skills; owner intrusion; inadequate contractor 
expertise; financing and payments problems; labour efficiency; improper 
planning, and subcontractors’ inefficiency (Musa, 2012: 5). Factors that 
influence cost overruns in public sector projects include change in scope of 
work on-site; incomplete design on tender stage; extension of time with cost; 
lack of cost plan and monitoring of funds; delays in pricing variation orders; 
changes in the scope (Ramabodu & Verster, 2013: 50); management style; 
lack of reviews of design; inadequate motivation of workers; economic 
policies; lack of adequate planning; lack of speedy payment to contractors, 
and quality of management during design and construction (Olatunji, 2010: 5)
Some of the reasons that contribute to cost and schedule overruns in any 
project (also megaprojects) include design error; inadequate scope; the 
weather; project changes, and underestimating the time for completing 
a project (Shrestha et al., 2013: 1). Megaprojects could pose even more 
causes, given their complexities and the huge conglomeration of activities 
that are under normal circumstances not linked to one another. 
2.3 The energy megaprojects
A tremendous increase in energy demand is expected, as there are still 
roughly 1.2 billion people who do not have modern energy services, in 
regions such as Asia, Latin America, and parts of Africa (Gray, 2017: 2). 
Energy projects can be categorised into nuclear, wind, coal, and biomass 
(Globe Newswire, 2019: 1). Currently, the world power-generation projects 
pipeline is worth US$4.46 trillion. Asia-Pacific is currently leading, with a 
project pipeline (including all projects from announcement to execution 
stage) valued at US$1.99 trillion, followed from a distance by the Middle 
East and Africa with a project value of US$960 billion. The Americas have 
power-generation projects with a value of US$852.3 billion, while the pipeline 
for Europe is valued at US$739.5 billion; these projects will provide an 
additional 2 450 GW of power capacity globally (Globe Newswire, 2019: 1). 
Global consumption of energy in 2017 reached 13 511 million tonnes of 
oil equivalent (Mtoe), according to the BP Statistical Review. Asia-Pacific 
contributed the most at 5 744 Mtoe, followed by the Americas with 3 473 
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Mtoe; Europe and Eurasia with 2 948 Mtoe, and the Middle East and Africa 
with 1 347 Mtoe (Globe Newswire, 2019: 1). 
Concerning world electricity production, coal continues to have the largest 
share at 38%, followed by renewables (principally hydropower) at 20%, 
nuclear at 17%, natural gas at 16%, and oil at 9%. Electricity production is 
expected to almost double by 2020 (Sims et al., 2003: 263). Over the next 
20 years, an unprecedented level of investment in energy infrastructure is 
predicted. The capital investment required to keep pace with the world’s 
energy needs to the year 2035 has been estimated as $48 trillion: $40 trillion 
of this sum will relate directly to investments in new and replacement energy 
infrastructure (IEA, 2014: 11). It is predicted that Europe alone will invest 
over $3 trillion in the energy sector over this period, and the vast majority 
(69%) of this will be in new power plants (IEA, 2014: 13). Increasing 
energy demand fosters the development of energy infrastructures (power 
plants, electrical grid, pipelines, and energy storage). Part of this energy 
demand will be satisfied by ‘small-scale projects’ (for example, gas turbine 
or rooftop photovoltaic plants), but some will be satisfied by large-scale 
and complex ‘megaprojects’, due to their capital nature; these include long 
pipelines, nuclear power plants, large wind farms, and large dams. With the 
new power plants, there are indications that three quarters of the spending 
will be on plants using nuclear power and renewable resources, with the 
remainder of the projects being fossil-fuel power plants (IEA, 2014: 13).
Energy investment decisions are generally guided by government policy 
rather than by market signals (Locatelli, Palerma & Mancini, 2015: 21). 
Government interventions in the installations of new plants represent a 
highly effective tool of any government’s policy and may contribute, as it 
does on many occasions, to a significant level of public expenditure (Maïzi 
& Assoumou, 2014: 850). Power Plant Megaprojects (PPMs) are often 
implemented too late, are very costly, and usually fail the general populace 
by not providing the expected benefits (Brookes & Locatelli, 2015: 3). 
2.4 importance and implementation of energy 
megaprojects
Critical infrastructure is the body of systems, networks, and assets that 
are so essential that their continued operation is required to ensure the 
security of a given nation, its economy, and the public’s health and/or 
safety (CISA, 2019: 4). A healthy critical infrastructure is the backbone 
of modern society, and is essential to national prosperity, because it 
enhances a nation’s productivity, quality of life, and economic progression, 
by driving growth, creating jobs, and improving productivity, quality of life, 
and efficiency (Department of Homeland Security, 2019: 1). This underpins 
growth by enabling the supportive networks upon which the economy 
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relies (Critical5, 2015: 2). Therefore, national frameworks and policies must 
contribute to a clearly articulated message that communicates the value, 
meaning, and importance of critical infrastructure. Resilient and secure 
infrastructure is vital for economic prosperity, because it underpins not 
only the effective operation of businesses and services, but also long-term 
confidence and planning in a region, and thus ongoing investment levels. 
Resilient infrastructure should have the ability to withstand and quickly 
recover from disruptions, deliberate attacks, accidents, or naturally occurring 
threats or incidents, and must essentially demonstrate robustness, agility, 
and adaptability (CISA, 2019: 11). Resilient and dependable networks enable 
business confidence, which leads to increased business investment and 
growth, and the creation of new economic opportunities (Critical5, 2015: 3). 
Disruptions of critical infrastructure have tangible and measurable direct 
and indirect economic impacts not only on dispersed workforce, commerce 
and manufacturing sectors, transportation, supply chains, and society as 
a whole, but also on broader regional and national impacts that can be 
measured in the loss of business and tax revenue generated in the affected 
areas (Critical5, 2015: 5).
According to Söderlund, Sankaran and Biesenthal (2018: 9), there are four 
essential and critical issues in megaproject management: their existence and 
prevalence; how they are managed and organised; their performance, or, as 
is generally believed, under-performance, and the future of megaprojects 
and how they could be enhanced to address major societal challenges. 
The management of infrastructure investments with high benefit-cost 
ratios may have a significant impact on government economic objectives 
and can result in improved confidence in current and future infrastructure 
(Critical5, 2015; CISA, 2019: 6). New critical infrastructure implementation 
such as energy projects is essentially critical, because either one has it or one 
does not have it, but its absence could hit the economy to a screeching halt. 
South Africa is an example of the mismanagement of new energy-sector 
megaprojects. In 2007, the South African economy was healthy when 
power shortages happened, halting operations at mines and smelters 
overnight. The then president Thabo Mbeki admitted to the prevarication by 
the government in not adding generation capacity on time, although there 
were clear prior signs that the supply was under strain. The power utility had 
no choice soon after that than to unleash a spending spree. The botched 
and hurried implementation has haunted the country ever since (Burkhardt 
& Cohen, 2019: 1). Corruption and state capture are regarded as the major 
reasons why coal plants Medupi and Kusile are not delivering electricity 
as planned and why South Africa is facing crippling blackouts. Medupi 
and Kusile, the third- and fourth-largest coal power plants globally, were 
originally scheduled to be completed in 2014 and 2012, respectively, giving 
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the country an extra 9600 MW of power, enough to avoid the now incessant 
blackouts (Gosling, 2019: 1).
It is thus necessary to understand the problems with the implementation of 
the new critical infrastructure projects, when they are in strategic sectors 
such as energy. 
2.5 The imperativeness of megaprojects in 
south Africa’s economic survival
As a direct result of apartheid policies, South Africa’s Nationalist government 
created a unique internal colonial system (Wolpe, 1975: 105), thus creating 
two parallel economies based on race. By the early 1990s, ‘White South Africa’ 
had all the makings of an advanced capitalist economy resplendent with 
multinational corporations, a sophisticated financial sector, and a functioning 
welfare system. Across the colour line existed a ‘non-White South Africa’, 
largely barred from the formal economy, except as a cheap source of labour, 
and exhibiting features of an internal colony (Padayachee, 2013: 14).
Megaprojects have become indispensable to easing the developmental 
bottlenecks occasioned by skewed apartheid societal priorities. These 
behemothic schemes have been operationalised for socio-economic 
transformation in sectors ranging from energy and extractives to 
manufacturing and housing. The ‘big project mentality’ currently adopted 
by the government seeks to “solve a whole bunch of problems” through 
the megaproject framework (Ballard & Rubin, 2017: 12). South Africa’s 
contemporary megaprojects are being implemented amid a global 
project- building boom. Gargantuan projects and programmes are 
increasingly becoming a popular delivery model in many sectors worldwide 
(Flyvbjerg, 2014: 3). Siemiatycki (2017: 5) posits that megaprojects come 
in cycles, driven by a convergence of economics, technical advancements, 
political/economic ideologies, and special interest groups. 
Post-1994 South Africa has largely embraced the megaproject framework, 
with billions of dollars financing huge projects such as the 2010 World Cup 
stadiums, the world’s third- and fourth-largest coal power plants (Medupi 
and Kusile), the Coega industrial zone, the large-scale ‘catalytic projects’ 
delivery strategy in housing, and extensions to ports, roads, and airports 
(including Cape Town, OR Tambo in Johannesburg, and King Shaka Airport 
in Durban), among others (Harrison & Todes, 2017: 2). Politicians have 
hailed megaprojects as drivers of socio-economic change, despite scant 
evidence to support these claims. However, it must be acknowledged that 
the methods of achieving the intended economic growth within a statist 
context are intertwined with the state’s capacity and infrastructural power. 
Moreover, megaprojects’ complexities and long timetables allow for periodic 
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renegotiations and, what Gualini and Majoor (2007: 315) term, “frame 
realignment”, or the reframing of project objectives when problems arise. 
As such, they can be a useful tool for building legitimacy and reinforcing 
the power of the state, particularly in difficult circumstances. However, the 
implementers still have to know the common problems and how to solve 
them. It is thus imperative to collate these problems, using current or past 
projects, as South Africa does not have a very long history of megaprojects 
implementation, especially in the energy sector in recent times.
3. sTudy AreA
Megaprojects in the context of developing African countries such as 
South Africa are a new phenomenon; any contextual nuances have to be 
understood first, then collated, whereafter solutions can be sought. There 
are not many megaprojects in South Africa, and only two could be studied in 
the energy sector, since they are the only ones that qualify as megaprojects 
($1 billion and above).
3.1 medupi power station
Medupi is a Greenfield coal-fired power plant project located in Lephalale, 
in the province of Limpopo, South Africa. It is the first dry-cooled baseload 
station built in 20 years by Eskom, following Kendal, Majuba, and Matimba 
power stations. The name ‘Medupi’ is a Sepedi (Northern Sotho language) 
word meaning “rain that soaks parched lands, giving economic relief”. 
The power station will be the third-largest coal plant in the southern 
hemisphere and the biggest dry-cooled power station in the world. The boiler 
and turbine contracts for Medupi are the largest contracts that Eskom has 
ever signed in its 90-year history (Eskom, 2014: 1). The planned operational 
life of the station is 50 years. The new power station will comprise six units 
with a gross nominal capacity of 800 MW each, resulting in a total capacity of 
4 800 MW. Construction activities commenced in May 2007 with the official 
original price tag of R79 billion, with the first of the six units of the power plant 
planned for first power by the end of 2014. This was not met, and in 2020, 
the project has not completely been commissioned. The cost has since 
escalated to roughly R143 billion (some sources say R300 billion) (Mail 
and Guardian, 2019). The final figures are still disputed, though, as will be 
explained below. On the positive side, job creation was expected to peak at 
17 000 direct jobs created during construction. The town of Lephalale’s gross 
domestic product (GDP) has increased by approximately 95% per year as 
a result of the project’s construction activities. The power station will directly 
grow South Africa’s GDP by approximately 0.35% per year. On a daily basis, 
22 340 meals were prepared and served to ensure that labourers were well 
fed to keep the morale and efficiency up (Eskom, 2014: 2).
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3.2 Kusile power station
The Kusile power station project, located near the existing Kendal power 
station, in the Nkangala district of Mpumalanga, will comprise six units, each 
rated at an 800 MW installed capacity for a total capacity of 4 800 MW. Once 
completed, Kusile will be the fourth-largest coal-fired power station in the 
world. The flue gas desulphurisation (FGD) plant is an integrated chemical 
plant using limestone as feedstock and producing gypsum as a by-product. 
The plant will peculiarly use an air-cooling system to help conserve 
water. The operational life of the power station is expected to be 50 years 
(Eskom, 2014: 1). Eleven years after construction started, not one of its six 
800 MW generator units was delivering power into the grid. Construction 
started at Kusile in 2008, and all six generation units were planned to be 
in commercial service by the end of 2014. However, the sad reality facing 
the country is that, as of July 2019, five years after 2014, only Unit 1 at 
Kusile had been handed over for commercial service. On the other hand, 
Units 2 and 3 had been synchronised to the grid; they were still undergoing 
mandatory testing and commissioning, meaning that the units were not in 
commercial service by the end of 2019 (Yelland, 2019: 1). The original cost 
in 2007 was estimated at R69.1 billion; by July 2016, the CTC was placed at 
R160 billion. However, according to Chris Yelland (Mybroadband, 2019: 1), 
an energy analyst in South Africa, the figures hide much information, and the 
real costs are shown in Table 1.
Table 1: True costs of Medupi and Kusile power stations
Costs of the project
Cost to complete (CTC)
Medupi Kusile
Approved CTC, excluding IPC and FGD R145 billion R161 billion
Estimated cost of flue gas desulphurisation 
(FGD) plant R39 billion R65 billion
Capitalised interest during construction 
(IDC) R50 billion R226 billion
Total cost R234 billion R460 billion
Source: Mybroadband (2019: 1)
4. meTHodology
The purpose of this study was to assess the causes of cost and schedule 
overruns in South African critical construction megaprojects, using Medupi 
and Kusile energy sector megaprojects. A quantitative research design 
was used, in which structured questionnaire surveys enable researchers 
to generalise their findings from a sampled population (Trueman, 2019; 
Creswell, 2014). The questionnaire rated the causes of cost and schedule 
overruns in construction megaprojects as well as the challenges when 
implementing energy megaprojects. A quantitative research approach 
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supports the use of interval Likert-type scales to measure data (Netemeyer, 
Bearden & Sharma, 2003) and allows for the use of descriptive statistics 
to analyse data (Brown, 2015: 11). Several data-analysis strategies are 
available, but, for this study, the mean scores of interval data were used to 
calculate the central tendency and to determine the composite (average) 
score of the Likert-type scale constructs (Bishop & Herron, 2015: 279).
4.1 sampling method and response rate
The population for this study consisted of 150 built environment professionals 
identified who are involved in the Kusile and Medupi megaprojects 
(Cox, 2011; Burns & Grove, 1993). The identified professionals included 
50 engineers, 40 architects, 35 quantity surveyors, ten project managers, 
and 15 contractors. Since there are many activities at these projects, only 
respondents who were directly involved with the actual building of the power 
plants were regarded as the target population. Seventy-five were directly 
involved with power-plant installation and were the target population, while 
the others were involved with the associated infrastructure. A sample size 
of 51 built environment professionals and contractors within the Kusile (25) 
and Medupi (26) megaprojects were randomly selected to participate in the 
survey (Alvi, 2016: 35). It was not possible to survey everyone, as some 
were simply not available. The built environment professionals included 
20 engineers, 12 architects, 11 quantity surveyors, four project managers, 
and four contractors. Although the sample size is not valid and not within 
the recommended sample size of 108 for a population equal to or above 
150 (Krejcie & Morgan, 1970: 608), the professionals directly involved with 
the actual building of the power plants chosen substantiate the size of the 
sample. After several reminders, only 17 – Kusile (seven) and Medupi 
(ten) – responses were received from the 51 respondents to whom the 
questionnaires were distributed. According to Moyo and Crafford (2010), 
contemporary built environment survey response rates range from 7% to 
40%; 33% is thus acceptable for this study (see Table 2).
Table 2: Questionnaire distribution and responses
Description Discipline Number distributed
Number of 
respondents
% Responses 
received
% Responses 
from total
Consultants
Architects 12 5 42% 29%
Quantity 
surveyors 11 3 27% 18%
Engineers 20 5 25% 29%
Project 
managers 4 4 100% 24%
Contractors 4 0 0% 0
Total 51 17 33% 100%
Tshidavhu & Khatleli •  Causes of schedule and cost overruns 
131
4.2 data collection
During April 2018, an online structured (partly open-ended) questionnaire 
survey was distributed via email to built environment professionals involved 
in the Kusile and Medupi megaprojects in South Africa. The questionnaire 
consisted of four sections. The first section relates to the demographics 
of the respondents. Section two is a set of nine 7-point Likert-scale items 
relating to the causes of schedule overrun. Section three covers a set of 
four 5-point Likert-scale items on the causes of cost overrun. Section four 
entails a set of 13 constructs with 27 items measured on a 7-point Likert 
scale to determine the challenges in the implementation of a megaproject. 
The data from these measurements forms the Likert-scale items used in the 
descriptive analysis of this study. To reduce the respondents’ bias, closed-
ended questions were preferred for sections two, three and four (Akintoye & 
Main, 2007: 601). The questionnaire was administered to the study sample, 
along with a covering letter indicating that participation in this survey was 
voluntary and that participants could withdraw at any point during the study.
4.3 Analysis and interpretation of the data
Interval Likert scales was used to measure how strongly respondents felt 
regarding the statements or questions in the Likert-scale constructs. Likert 
scales are effective where numbers can be used to quantify the results 
of measuring behaviours, attitudes, preferences, and even perceptions 
(Wegner, 2016: 11).
For the purpose of analysis of the 7-point Likert scale, the ranges relative 
to the MS are defined as follows: >1.00 to ≤1.86 (strongly disagree); >1.86 
to ≤2.71 (disagree); >2.71 to ≤3.57 (somewhat disagree); >3.57 to ≤4.44 
(neither agree nor disagree); >4.44 to ≤5.30 (somewhat agree); >5.30 
to ≤6.16 (agree), and >6.16 to ≤7.00 (strongly agree). For the purpose 
of analysis of the 5-point Likert scale, the ranges relative to the MS are 
defined as follows: >1.00 to ≤1.80 (strongly disagree); >1.80 to ≤2.60 
(disagree); >2.60 to ≤3.40 (neutral); >3.40 to ≤4.20 (agree), and >4.20 to 
≤5.00 (strongly agree).
The Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) version 23 
(Pallant, 2015) was used to process the interval scales and to analyse 
them, using descriptive statistics such as means, modes, and standard 
deviations. The mean of responses was generated, in order to analyse and 
rank the causes of schedule and cost overruns as well as the challenges in 
implementing energy megaprojects. Only the mean of the items was used 
to show the central tendency and to rank the factors in order of the most 
agreed to the least agreed. 
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4.4 limitation of the study
During the time of the study, Eskom, the South African public electricity utility 
company, was under intense public scrutiny and the subject of a number 
of high-profile investigations against perceived rampant graft within the 
organisation. The leadership instability at Eskom had occasioned a climate 
of mistrust to outsiders, making accessing informative sources sometimes 
difficult. However, those who cooperated still provided valuable information. 
The contractors involved would have done well to respond, but their non-
cooperation compelled the study to proceed without their input. It is possible 
that, since their client was going through a difficult time, they felt it safe for 
the sake of their businesses to not participate in the study, as any negative 
utterance could result in disadvantageous reprisals. Nevertheless, key 
individuals in strategic positions were engaged with, and their input proved 
to be crucial to the study’s findings.
5. resulTs ANd discussioN
5.1 respondents’ profile
Table 3 presents the profile of respondents to the questionnaire survey. 
The distribution shows that the majority of the respondents have between 
11 and 15 years’ work experience.
Table 3: Respondents’ work experience
No. of years’ work 
experience) Architect
Quantity 
surveyor Engineer
Project 
manager Total
1-5 years 1 1
6-10 years 2 2
11-15 years 1 2 3 2 8
16-20 years 1 2 3
21 years and above 3 3
Total respondents 5 3 5 4 17
Three architects have over 21 years’ work experience, and have 16-20 years’ 
and 11-15 years’ work experience, respectively. Two quantity surveyors 
have 11-15 years’ work experience and 1-5 years’ work experience. Two 
engineers have 16-20 years’ work experience, while three have 11-15 years’ 
work experience. Two project managers have 6-10 years’ work experience 
and two have 11-15 years’ work experience. The greater majority of the 
respondents have more experience in the construction industry.
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5.2 ranking of the factors causing schedule overrun 
Table 4 shows the mean score, and ranks the nine factors identified from 
construction literature to show which factors are mostly responsible for 
schedule overrun in energy megaprojects.
Table 4: The causes of schedule overrun in energy megaprojects 
Factors (N = 17)
(1 = strongly 
disagree …
7 = strongly agree)
Discipline
Overall
Architect Quantity surveyor Engineer
Project 
manager
MS Rank MS Rank MS Rank MS Rank MS Rank
Incomplete 
drawings 3.60 8 5.00 3 4.60 7 4.00 6 4.25 8
Design changes 4.80 6 5.33 2 5.80 3 5.75 3 5.41 3
Slow client 
decision-making 6.00 2 5.33 2 6.20 1 5.25 5 5.76 1=
Late issue of 
instruction 4.40 7 4.67 4 4.80 6 5.50 4 4.82 6
Shortage of skilled 
labour 6.40 1 4.00 5 6.00 2 6.00 2 5.76 1=
Poor planning and 
scheduling 5.80 3 6.00 1 5.00 5 6.25 1 5.71 2
Labour unrest 4.80 6 4.67 4 3.40 8 5.50 4 4.53 7
Shortage of 
manpower 5.60 4 4.67 4 5.00 5 5.50 4 5.24 5
Delay in work 
approval 5.20 5 4.00 5 5.40 4 6.25 1 5.29 4
Average MS 
(composite score) 5.22
The factors in Table 4 were ranked per discipline, and the results indicated 
that architects believed that the number one cause of schedule overrun is 
shortage of skilled labour with MS 6.40. Quantity surveyors believed that 
poor planning and scheduling is the number one factor causing schedule 
overrun with MS 6.00. The engineers ranked slow client decision-making 
as the number one factor causing schedule overrun with MS 6.20. Project 
managers ranked poor planning and scheduling as the number one factor 
causing schedule overrun with MS 6.25.
Shortage of skilled labour, poor planning and scheduling, and slow client 
decision-making were rated as the top three causes by the architects, 
quantity surveyors, engineers, and project managers who participated in 
the survey and who are also working on megaprojects in South Africa. 
Shortage of skilled labour, which could affect planning, design, and 
scheduling, may be a result of the rushed implementation of these 
megaprojects in South Africa. The rushed implementation does not allow 
adequate staffing and upskilling of key personnel. This means that the very 
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foundations of the implementation process are shaky from the onset. It also 
cascades to other problems downstream, such as incomplete drawings, a 
great deal of rework, and design changes, as depicted in Table 4. This has 
been a very unfortunate South African trademark in the implementation of 
energy megaprojects.
The average mean of 5.22 demonstrates that, overall, all the factors cause 
schedule overrun in energy megaprojects in South Africa.
Slow client decision-making with MS 5.76 and shortage of skilled labour with 
MS 5.76 are ranked as the number one factors that cause schedule overrun 
in study area megaprojects. Poor planning and scheduling with MS 5.71, 
design changes with MS 5.41, and delay in work approval with MS 5.29 
are ranked number two to four, respectively. The results in Table 4 show 
that these factors could contribute to project implementation sluggishness 
in South Africa. A study by Tahir et al. (2017: 3) indicated that the project 
teams’ slow rate in making decisions is one of the causes of delay that could 
contribute to project implementation sluggishness. The issues identified in 
this instance are indicative of project management teams that are either 
overwhelmed or not sufficiently knowledgeable. The results appear not to 
show that the influence of external factors (Musa, 2012: 6) such as labour 
unrest and shortage of manpower is not very strong, again putting the 
blame on the technical capacity of the project managers/implementers.
5.3 ranking of the factors causing cost overrun 
Table 5 shows the mean score, and ranks the four factors identified from 
construction literature to show which factors are mostly responsible for cost 
overrun in energy megaprojects.
Table 5: The causes of cost overrun in energy megaprojects
Factors (N = 17)
(1 = strongly disagree 
… 5 = strongly agree)
Discipline
Overall
Architect Quantity surveyor Engineer
Project 
manager
MS Rank MS Rank MS Rank MS Rank MS Rank
Increase in 
material cost 3.20 4 3.00 2 3.00 4 3.00 2 3.06 4
Inaccurate material 
estimate 4.60 1 2.33 3 4.40 1 3.00 2 3.76 1
Shortage of 
skilled labour 3.60 3 2.33 3 4.20 2 4.00 1 3.65 2
Client’s late 
contract award 4.00 2 3.67 1 3.20 3 2.50 3 3.35 3
Average MS  
(composite score) 3.45
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The factors in Table 5 were ranked per discipline, and the results indicated that 
architects believed that the number one cause of cost overrun is inaccurate 
material estimating, with MS 4.60. Quantity surveyors believed that client’s 
late contract award is the number one factor causing cost overrun, with 
MS 3.67. The engineers ranked inaccurate material estimating number 
one factor causing cost overrun, with MS 4.40. Project managers ranked 
shortage of skilled labour as the number one factor causing cost overrun, 
with MS 4.00. According to the consultants who participated in this study, 
inaccurate material estimates, shortage of skilled labour, and the client’s late 
contract award are regarded as the main causes of cost overrun in energy 
sector megaprojects in South Africa. The findings of Musa (2012: 13) show 
that insufficient labour skills could affect the proper estimating of materials, 
given the enormity and complexity of the projects. It is intriguing that there 
appears to be some congruence in responses from people from different 
disciplines. However, unlike in Malaysia (Tahir et al., 2017: 1), where there 
appears to be changes in laws and regulations during project execution, 
this does not seem to be a challenge in this instance, meaning that there is 
simply lack of knowledge on proper executing methods.
The average mean of 3.45 demonstrates that, overall, all the factors cause 
schedule overrun in energy megaprojects in South Africa.
Inaccurate material estimate, with MS 3.76, is the number one ranked factor 
causing cost overrun in study area megaprojects. Shortage of skilled labour, 
with MS 3.65, client’s late contract award, with MIS 3.35, and increase in 
material cost with MIS 3.06 are ranked numbers 2 to 4, respectively. It is 
very instructive for other megaprojects that are heavily reliant on imported 
components and materials that the scheduling be done properly, in order 
to avoid any inefficiencies that could hamper implementation. The energy 
products were using highly specialised components produced by niche 
manufacturers who might be inundated with orders from across the globe. 
Thus, any misestimated order would have to wait for a long time to augment 
the numbers. The actual issuing of contracts is hardly surprising, as the lack 
of experts working for the public sector could mean that it takes time to source 
the expertise or that the in-house expertise is inundated with the workload.
5.4 ranking of challenges in the implementation of 
energy megaprojects
Table 6 shows the mean score, and ranks the 27 items identified from 
construction literature to show the overall challenges with the implementation 
of energy megaprojects. From Table 6, poor site management (MS = 6.71), 
inadequate managerial skills (MS = 6.65), poor monitoring and control 
(MS = 6.53), unstable management structure (MS = 6.41), and lack of 
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experience together with poor organisation structures (MS = 6.29) are the 
dominant challenges in South Africa.
Table 6: Challenges in the implementation of energy megaprojects
Construct
Items affecting the implementation of 
megaproject (N = 17) (1 = strongly 
disagree … 7 = strongly agree)
MS Rank Overall rank
Communication 
factors
Lack of communication between 
contractor and client 5.47 2 17
Inefficient communication 5.82 1 10
Management
Poor site management 6.71 1 1
Inadequate managerial skills 6.65 2 2
Poor monitoring and control 6.53 3 3
Slow decision making 6.18 4 7
Personnel
Shortage of managerial and supervisory 
staff 6.12 3 8
Shortage of skilled labour 6.24 2 6=
Lack of experience 6.29 1 5=
Low motivation 5.41 4 18
Organisational
Unstable management structure 6.41 1 4
Poor organisation structure 6.29 2 5=
Planning
Client initiated change order 5.71 2 12
Inadequate design specification 5.82 1 10
Rework 5.71 2 12
Poor labour planning 5.59 3 14
Site conditions Unforeseen ground conditions 5.53 16
Weather Harsh weather conditions 4.94 20
Project-related
Project complexity 5.65 1 13
Project duration 4.94 2 20
Material-related
Shortage of equipment 5.24 2 19
Poor material planning 6.24 1 6=
Other
Slow decision-making, knowledge 
of specifications, material ordering, 
approved materials, increase in 
material cost, and market unavailability
5.57 15
Process-related Poor procedures 5.76 11
Financial
Delayed payment to contractors/
consultants 6.24 1 6=
Poor financial planning 6.06 2 9
Price-related Price increase 4.94 20
Average MS 
(composite score) 5.85
The top five challenges are management and organisational related, showing 
that there is not enough local management and organisational expertise in 
South Africa to ensure the proper planning and effective implementation 
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of energy megaprojects. One essential and critical issue in successful 
implementation is the management and organisation of megaprojects 
(Söderlund et al., 2018: 9) Since these projects are critical to the economy, 
adequate planning for their implementation should have been carried out 
(Tahir et al., 2017). With MS = 6.24, respondents agreed that shortage of 
skilled labour; poor material planning, and delayed payment to contractors/
consultants, which relates to personnel, material and financial issues, is 
challenging for the successful implementation of energy megaprojects in 
South Africa. It is imperative for Eskom that the majority of the top managers 
be skilled, well trained and stay employed for the long haul, in order to 
preserve institutional memory and to learn from their mistakes so that they 
can make well-informed decisions when required.
6. coNclusioN ANd recommeNdATioNs
This study assessed the causes of cost and schedule overruns as well 
as the challenges with the implementation of energy sector megaprojects 
in South Africa. The study identified the causes of schedule and cost 
overruns as well as the challenges militating against the project’s 
implementation success. 
The results show that architects, quantity surveyors, engineers, and project 
managers, who participated in the survey and who are also working on 
megaprojects in South Africa, rated shortage of skilled labour, poor planning 
and scheduling, and slow client decision-making as the top three causes 
for schedule overruns. Inaccurate material estimate, client’s late contract 
award, shortage of skilled labour, and increase in material cost were rated 
the top four factors causing cost overrun in energy megaprojects. 
The top five challenges in the successful implementation of energy 
megaprojects in South Africa were poor site management, inadequate 
managerial skills, poor monitoring and control, unstable management 
structure, poor organisation structure, and lack of experience. Most of 
these challenges are management and organisational related, showing 
that there is no adequate local management and organisational expertise 
in South Africa to ensure the proper planning and effective implementation 
of energy megaprojects.
South Africa should take the hard lessons garnered so far and accept 
that capacitation is needed to implement these huge critical projects. 
The national energy needs projections should be revised periodically, and 
interventions by way of new projects should never be rushed. The study 
has shown that, although the challenges bedevilling megaprojects are 
the same globally, as they are in South Africa, the South African causes 
of budget overflow and programme slippage are particularly preventable, 
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as they appear to be underpinned by poor planning and management. 
The improvement of implementation performance is critical, as there are 
likely to be more critical megaprojects yet to be implemented. Since there 
are no specific solutions to mitigate the factors in existing literature, it is 
thus recommended that specific solutions that could mitigate the causes 
of cost and schedule overruns be included in future studies. The following 
recommendations are proposed for further studies:
• The study should investigate the effectiveness of megaprojects 
procurement systems in South Africa.
• The study should also investigate the level of expertise of 
South African construction professionals in handling complex 
projects with intricate interfaces.
• The study of the specific nuances of critical energy projects should 
be prioritised.
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